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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2049 
___________ 
 
THERMUTHIS LEE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KMART 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-16-cv-02011) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
August 3, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 10, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Thermuthis Lee, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of Kmart 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Corporation in her employment discrimination action.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 The record reflects that Lee worked part-time for Kmart as a cashier from 
approximately 2007 to 2012.  Thereafter, Lee suffered from health issues requiring 
kidney dialysis treatment.  In 2014, Lee sought to return to work and applied for a part-
time cashier position at a different Kmart store.1  Lee stated in her application that she 
could work twenty to twenty-nine hours per week.  She also stated that she could work on 
Saturdays and Sundays from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and Tuesdays and Thursdays from 
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., and that she could not work on Mondays, Wednesdays, and 
Fridays.  Lee called Kmart about her application and Eliza Woodson, a Human Resources 
employee, scheduled her for an interview.     
 The interview did not go well.  Woodson provided an affidavit stating that Lee 
insisted that she should be hired because she had worked for Kmart before.  Woodson 
stated that Lee had a bad attitude and that she believed that she would not interact well 
with customers.  Woodson also stated that she asked Lee if she had any additional 
availability, that Lee told her that she was only available during the hours identified in 
her application, and that Lee said she could not work on the days that she received 
dialysis.  According to Woodson, Lee did not explain why her availability on other days  
                                              
1The details of Lee’s prior employment are not relevant as there is no evidence that they 
were a factor in Kmart’s subsequent hiring decision.   
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was limited to defined, four-hour time frames.  Woodson stated that she did not pursue 
Lee further based on the interview and because there were other candidates with open 
availability during the store’s twelve to thirteen hours of daily operation.  
 Lee testified at her deposition that Woodson became angry with her when she 
called to schedule an interview because Lee had interrupted another telephone call.  She 
stated that the tone of the interview was negative.  Lee testified that she told Woodson 
that she has a medical condition, that she needed “to be able to work around these days 
and times,” but that she could change the schedule she had provided.  See 1/5/17 Trans. 
at 93.  Lee also said that she told Woodson that the on-line application required that she 
specify times that she could work and that she put in the times that she did in order to 
advance to the next question.  Although her testimony is not entirely clear, Lee appears to 
state that she told Woodson that she could not commit to working on the days that she 
had dialysis (Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays) but that she might be able to change 
her treatment days.  Lee stated that she asked for a flexible schedule, but Woodson told 
her that there were other candidates who had more availability.  
 After Lee learned that she did not get the job, she filed a charge of disability 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The EEOC 
dismissed the charge.2  Lee filed a complaint in Pennsylvania state court against Kmart  
                                              
2Lee also reported her discrimination claim to Kmart’s human resources consulting 
service.  An investigation was conducted and subsequently closed.   
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for discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 12101 et seq., and Kmart removed the case to District Court.  Following discovery, 
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kmart.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
plenary.  Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 As recognized by the District Court, to the extent Lee claims disparate treatment 
on account of her disability based on Kmart’s decision not to hire her, the burden-shifting 
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies.  Shaner, 
204 F.3d at 500.  Lee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that 
she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job 
with or without reasonable accommodations, and that she has suffered an adverse 
employment decision as a result of discrimination.  Id.  The burden then shifts to Kmart 
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Lee.  Id.  Lee must then 
show that the reason offered was a pretext for discrimination.  Id. 
 The District Court concluded that, even if Lee was qualified and established a 
prima facie case, there is not an issue of fact as to whether the reasons Kmart advanced 
for not hiring her – her limited availability and poor interview – were a pretext for 
discrimination.  We agree.  Woodson stated that Kmart sought candidates with a wide 
range of availability to cover the hours that the store operated.  Other candidates stated on 
their applications that they were available anytime.  Lee testified that she told Woodson 
that the hours she had stated she was available could be changed and she argues on 
appeal that her application reflects that she could work between twenty and twenty-nine 
 5 
 
hours per week.  But there is no evidence from which a juror would disbelieve that Lee’s 
lesser availability compared to other candidates was a reason Woodson did not wish to 
hire her.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (pretext may be shown 
with evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably disbelieve the employer’s 
reason).  Also, while the parties may dispute why the interview did not go well, it is 
undisputed that it was not a good interview.   
 There is also no evidence from which a juror could reasonably believe that “an 
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause” for Woodson’s decision.  See id.  To the contrary, Lee stated at her deposition that 
Woodson did not give her any reason to believe that the way she was treating her was 
because she had a disability.  Woodson attested that her brother had kidney dialysis and 
that she would not have disqualified a candidate on this basis.  Lee argues on appeal that 
Woodson failed to acknowledge in her affidavit and concealed that she had submitted an 
earlier application for a cashier position, but the relevance of that application is unclear as  
Woodson does not appear to have received it and she interviewed Lee after she submitted  
the second application.  
 The District Court also granted summary judgment to the extent Lee claims that 
Kmart failed to accommodate her disability.  Under the ADA, discrimination includes 
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical . . . limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant . . ., unless [the 
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
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 . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).3  While reasonable accommodations include 
modified work schedules, id. § 12111(9), Lee was required to make a prima facie 
showing that her proposed accommodation is possible.  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate 
USA, 440 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2006).  The burden then shifts to Kmart to prove that 
the accommodation is unreasonable.  Id. 
 We agree with the District Court that Lee did not meet her initial burden.  Lee 
sought a flexible schedule as an accommodation.  The District Court noted, and the 
record reflects, that Lee stated that she told Woodson that she could work hours other 
than those set forth on her application, but she did not define what those hours were.  
Lee’s testimony suggests that at the time of the interview she did not yet know when she 
would be able to work because she was just starting dialysis.  See 1/5/17 Trans. at 104-
06.  She admitted in her response in opposition to the summary judgment motion that she 
did not then know how much she would be able to do.  Resp. at 16.  Lee’s proposed 
accommodation of a flexible schedule was “clearly ineffective” and summary judgment 
was warranted.  See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 
670 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 To the extent Lee claims that Kmart failed to engage in good faith in the 
interactive process and assist in seeking an accommodation, her deposition testimony 
raises a factual issue as to whether she asked Woodson for an accommodation.  See 
                                              
3A “qualified individual” is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires.”  Id. § 12111(8).  Because the issue of the existence of a reasonable 
accommodation is dispositive, we do not address whether Lee was “qualified.” 
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Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018) (deposition testimony setting 
forth facts that contradicted the defendants’ evidence established a genuine issue of 
material fact).  Summary judgment, however, was still warranted because, as above, there 
is insufficient evidence showing that Lee could have been reasonably accommodated.  
See Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth showing 
required to establish employer failed to engage in the interactive process).   
 Lee argues on appeal that the District Court failed to consider the exhibits to her 
response to Kmart’s summary judgment motion, which are not included in the record.  
Lee has not shown that the exhibits preclude summary judgment.  Some of the exhibits, 
for example, show that Lee was recognized for excellent customer service, but the 
District Court did not decide whether Lee was qualified for the position.  Lee also argues 
that Kmart did not file her entire deposition transcript in District Court, but she did not 
present this argument below and it is not properly before us.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
 
                                              
4Lee states in her brief that she is appealing a Clerk’s Order providing that this appeal 
will not be considered for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or summary 
action.  Lee does not explain why she seeks review of the order and we do not consider it. 
